Trump, Xi, and the false hope of a grand bargain

By Patricia M. Kim for John L. Thorton Center at Brookings

Donald Trump has always prided himself on being the ultimate dealmaker. His actions since taking office—engaging directly with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, and even floating the idea of a trilateral Cold War-style nuclear arms deal—underscore his preference for backroom negotiations with strongmen.

Speculation is mounting about what kind of grand bargain Trump might try to strike with Xi. Will he pursue a Richard Nixon-style reset with Beijing? Could he agree to overlook Chinese aggression toward Taiwan in exchange for Beijing’s commitment to buy more American goods and to help reindustrialize America? Might he trade U.S. influence in Asia for China’s help in ending the war in Ukraine?

Beijing, for its part, has been testing the waters. Since November, a steady stream of Chinese delegations has made visits to Washington, quietly probing for what kind of deal might be possible. Meanwhile, within Trump’s orbit and American foreign policy circles, there is no consensus on what, if anything, Washington should ask of China. Some argue that rebalancing the U.S.-China economic relationship should be a priority. Others insist that dealing with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is futile and advocate for a full-scale strategic decoupling.

Yet for all the speculation, no one has landed on the perfect contours of a grand bargain. The reason is simple: no such deal exists.

The allure of a single, sweeping deal is understandable. It offers the promise of clarity in a troubled, high-stakes relationship. But history proves that there is no silver bullet. Managing U.S.-China relations since Nixon’s dramatic visit to China in 1972 has not been about grand gestures or chasing some mythical end state. It requires the tough but ongoing work of strategic management—balancing competition and cooperation, setting firm boundaries, and constantly recalibrating to protect American interests.

The myth of a single breakthrough

For decades, both the United States and China have sought an elusive, all-encompassing agreement—one that would, in a single stroke, resolve their fundamental disputes. Time and again, both sides have been disappointed. The reality is that many of their core demands are irreconcilable.

For China, a grand bargain would mean securing U.S. acquiescence to its key ambitions: the annexation of Taiwan, endorsement of the CCP’s rule at home, and an uncontested sphere of influence across Asia and beyond. China also wants unrestricted access to U.S. markets and technology while maintaining its own protectionist policies. It portrays any American pushback as limiting China’s rise and as contrary to free trade principles—despite its own egregious track record of state-led economic intervention and coercive trade practices.

For the United States, a grand bargain would demand the very things China refuses to concede: renouncing military aggression against Taiwan and in the East and South China Seas, curbing its non-market economic policies that have long disadvantaged American businesses, improving its human rights record, and embracing democratic practices at home. Washington has also long sought Beijing’s help in pressuring rogue states like North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, or North Korea and Russia today, in ways that would jeopardize China’s ties with its few allies and partners and leave it strategically isolated.

These demands cut to the heart of each state’s core strategic interests, political identity, and values—which is why attempts at sweeping deals have failed in the past.

Perhaps Trump is the best negotiating partner Beijing will ever get, given his unconventional views on Taiwan—which he sees more as an economic competitor than a key democratic ally. But even within his own administration, let alone the broader Republican Party, there is little agreement with such views. And Beijing knows well that any commitment made by one U.S. president can be reinterpreted or overturned by the next. A perennial Chinese complaint is that Washington has shifted the terms of its “One China” policy, despite the Three Communiques and other U.S. reassurances that have been made in the past.

More importantly, the same could be said for China. Despite its authoritarian system and the fact that Xi is unconstrained by term limits, Beijing has shown time and again that it will break promises when it suits its interests. Xi’s 2015 pledge at the White House not to militarize islands in the South China Sea is just one glaring example.

A more realistic approach

The answer is not to declare that bilateral engagement is futile—but that any approach must be grounded in realism, not wishful thinking. Rather than chasing an elusive grand bargain, the United States and China should adopt a more pragmatic, disciplined approach.

It could begin with Trump and Xi establishing broad expectations—outlining what each side seeks (such as a stable and fair economic relationship with mutual safeguards for national security) and what they reject (war and full-scale decoupling).

From there, the hard work begins: negotiating targeted, issue-specific agreements on trade, fentanyl, arms control, and crisis management.

Equally important is establishing credible enforcement mechanisms to address violations and ensure accountability. Washington must be prepared to confront violations, penalize bad behavior, and strategically deploy incentives to encourage compliance.

For Washington to shape the U.S.-China relationship to its advantage, it must engage Beijing from a position of strength. That means investing in its own economic resilience, military capabilities, technological leadership, and global alliances. At the same time, the United States should sustain measured economic and diplomatic ties with China—not as a concession, but for its own benefit. Without such engagement, America’s ability to influence Beijing diminishes, leaving military confrontation as the only remaining tool of leverage—an outcome that is both dangerous and unrealistic.

This approach isn’t new—it’s how U.S.-China relations have been managed for decades. It’s never easy and often unsatisfying. But at the end of the day, it delivers better results than either extreme—naïve appeasement or outright hostility and disengagement.

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Patricia M. Kim
Fellow – Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, John L. Thornton China Center